The Tea Party: Pure Ideology or Economic Dissatisfaction?

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Abstract

The Tea Party proved to be a serious political force in the 2010 midterm elections. Although well-mobilized, the Tea Party remained a decentralized movement manifesting only a few general themes. Tea Party supporters in 2010 shared a negative view of the economy and the current conditions in Washington, disliked the Affordable Care Act, and wanted a smaller, more limited role for the government. Previous research has shown that the outcome of the 2010 midterm elections was consistent with the theory of incumbent parties being voted out of office when the popular sentiment about the economy is negative. This project seeks to expand on that theory and identify common factors in districts electing freshman Tea Party members which may have led to greater mobilization and support for the movement, particularly economic factors. This will facilitate a better understanding of the factors directly influencing the voters who were the strongest supporters of the Tea Party, and attempt to identify some of the potential causes of the movement.

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After the election of Barack Obama in 2008, a new Conservative movement under the name of the Tea Party emerged in American politics. What started out as a small, grassroots initiative quickly grew into a national force, with several Tea Party candidates emerging to pose challenges to incumbent Republicans and Democrats in competitive districts in the 2010 midterm elections. Republicans won a majority in the House of Representatives in 2010, often, it was assumed, because of the Tea Party movement, whether because of the actual votes the Tea Party was able to deliver, the enthusiasm it was able to conjure up for Conservative viewpoints, or merely its ability to capitalize on the preexisting dissatisfaction with politics in Washington. All-in-all, 60 Republican Members of Congress elected to join the Tea Party Caucus in the House of Representatives after they took office in January of 2011 (Travis 2011). Although a minority, they exercised a disproportionate amount of control in significant policy battles—most notably the debt ceiling debates in the summer of 2011, often pushing the entire House Republican Caucus further to the right and into more uncompromising policy positions.

Much of the scholarship on the Tea Party has taken the form of examining the 2010 election results and focusing on the makeup of the movement individually and structurally. Prior research has identified the demographics of Tea Party membership. Much of this has also been focused on the goals of the Tea Party-what it stands for, how it operates, and who is really behind it financially. Some of the scholarship then moves on to look at how the Tea Party influenced the 2010 midterm elections. Relatively little of the research looks at the policy positions of the Tea Party in Congress or why candidates sympathetic to the Tea Party movement did better in some districts than in others.

Research on the Tea Party has noted several significant demographic characteristics of its supporters. Skocpol and Williamson (2012) note first and foremost that Tea Party supporters

represented a minority of the American public, "about one-fifth of voting-age adults, or roughly 46 million Americans" (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012, p. 22). A CBS/New York Times poll released in April 2010 reported that roughly 75% were over the age of 45. Other polls have noted proportions slightly lower than this but still high enough to conclude that most Tea Party supporters are over 45 (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). They also are more likely to have supported Republican candidates. In the NYT/CBS poll, 18% of respondents said they "always" voted Republican while another 48% noted they "usually" voted Republican" (New York Times and CBS News, 2010, p. 35). They were also more likely than the general population to attend church services every week (38% of Tea Party respondents, 27% of other respondents) or almost every week (12% of Tea Party, 8% of population). The majority of Tea Party supporters were also Protestant and married (New York Times and CBS News 2010). Tea Party supporters were better-educated than the average voter with 33% noting they had "some college," 23% being "college grads," and 14% having post-graduate education (New York Times and CBS News, 2010, p. 41). They are overwhelmingly white (89%), majority male (59%), and more located in higher income brackets (New York Times and CBS News 2010).

The beginning of the Tea Party can be traced to Rick Santelli's nationally-broadcast statement (Skocpol and Williamson 2012) focusing on the massive government bailouts and the increasing burden taxpayers were shouldering for those who were considered by many to have made irresponsible decisions. The movement picked up speed when Glenn Beck championed the cause on Fox News. As often happens with grassroots movements, the smaller local organizations had significant autonomy as to what their groups would do, allowing them to tailor interests to their constituencies. Although this structure lends itself to disparate interests, in

general, the Tea Party seemed to express distaste for government and a commitment to the Constitution (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Skocpol and Williamson (2012) note that the Tea Party is fairly united in its opposition to the Affordable Care Act and support for a decreased government role in the economy (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). They are quick to point out that Tea Party disdain for government does not extend to all programs. Most notably, Tea Partiers support Medicare, Social Security, and disability payments. They have paid into these systems and expect to see their money back (Williamson, Skocpol and Coggin 2011). They relate these seemingly opposing views back to differences in "the perceived deservingness of recipients" and views on those who are versus those who are not working (Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 2011, p. 33). Medicare and Social Security draw strong support from the Tea Party because those are systems they have invested in with their personal work earnings rather than being "government handouts" (Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 2011, p. 33). This extends to illegal immigrants, whom Tea Party supporters view negatively in general and as individuals who are receiving handouts one way or another. Many Tea Partiers also seemed to translate this into contempt for the younger generations with a sense that many in that category do not work as hard as they did (Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 2011).

At times the Tea Party rhetoric seems to expose underlying currents of racial prejudice. Skocpol and Williamson (2012) cite that, "At least one scholarly study suggests that problematic racial assumptions are widely held by Tea Party supporters" (p. 69). Skocpol and Williamson point out that these views are centered on the idea that minorities are not as hardworking. This seems to be consistent with the anecdotal evidence Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin (2011) provide for negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants. Institutionally, however, the Tea Party

has been very careful to minimize the image of being a group which is affiliated with racist views. They have been more outspoken, however, in their views on other groups. "…Fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims were commonly expressed" (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, p. 69).

Although the Tea Party movement is fundamentally a grassroots movement that relies on citizens taking active, prominent roles on the local level, national organizations and funders have been influential in the movement. Skocpol and Williamson draw attention to the fact that national, Conservative organizations such as Freedom Works and Americans for Prosperity have been heavily involved in the movement. Media channels, particularly Fox News and affiliates such as Glenn Beck helped to spread the word about the grassroots happenings. Skocpol and Williamson (2012) have reported a certain amount of strain between the Republican establishment and the Tea Party grassroots. Michael Steele, the former Chairman of the Republican National Committee, was early on excluded from Tea Party events (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). This dynamic has been echoed by Ashbee (2011).

Fox News and Glenn Beck were particularly helpful in spreading the word about the growing Tea Party movement and adding fuel to the fire (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Glenn Beck's "9/12 Project" fit in well with Tea Party views (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, p. 133-134) and, "worked with Freedom Works and other Tea Party groups to co-sponsor the first unified national manifestation of Tea Party enthusiasm" (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, p. 134). Freedom Works and Americans for Prosperity, both proponents of more libertarian ideas, were likewise big supporters of the movement. But these groups had preexisting policy goals. In this respect, their alliance with the Tea Party gained them grassroots support for goals serving select special interests rather than populism (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

When Republicans won enough seats in the 2010 midterm elections to secure a majority in the House of Representatives many attributed this to the rise and support of the Tea Party. Studies have shown, however, that the results of these elections were highly predictable based on the usual factors such as the economy and the popularity of the President. Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope (2011) found little correlation between Tea Party support as judged by endorsements, and those candidates who won their election. Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) similarly point to various other factors outside of Tea Party support that much more strongly corresponded with the results.

Karpowitz et al. examined the results of the 2010 midterm elections, specifically measuring the effect Tea Party endorsements had on the election. They find that the endorsement of Freedom Works was the only type of endorsement that was correlated in a significant way with an increase in the likelihood that a candidate would win in his or her district. Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope (2011) note that this is a correlation only. They go on to explain that Freedom Works not only endorsed candidates but donated money, though a much smaller amount to each individual candidate (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope 2011). Karpowitz et al. attribute this correlation to the fact that "Freedom Works was more strategic in its choice of candidates than some other Tea Party-affiliated groups" (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope 2011, p. 306). Freedom Works generally endorsed candidates in districts in which they had more competitive races. In the primaries, they found that endorsements did raise Tea Party-affiliated candidates' percentage of the vote by 8-9% and signing the Contract From America (a document expressing specific Tea Party endorsed views) increased their percentage of the vote by around 20% (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope 2011). Overall, Karpowitz, Monson,

Patterson, and Pope (2011) conclude that Tea Party support had a relatively small effect on Republican victories in 2010.

Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) find that the Tea Party was not a determining factor in the midterm elections. The authors, "analyze House races in districts held by Democrats in the 111th Congress" (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2012, p. 5). They then look at endorsements, the underlying partisan distribution in the district, "challenger quality" which was generally based on previous elected office experience, the amount a candidate spent on their election, and the incumbent's vote on the Affordable Care Act (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2012, p. 5-10). "Against the backdrop of the control variables, Tea Party candidates did not run significantly better than did Republicans without a Tea Party endorsement" (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2012, p. 10). Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) conclude that the Tea Party had relatively little effect on the outcomes of the 2010 midterm elections.

Jacobson (2011) notes that the Tea Party movement capitalized on preexisting views. The Tea Party was overtly and overwhelmingly opposed to Barack Obama. This translated into dissatisfaction with other members of the Democratic Party. Unlike Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope (2011) and Bond, Fleisher and Ilderton (2012), Jacobson (2011) does find an effect on independent voters and attributes the rate at which independents voted for Republicans largely to the Tea Party. In conclusion, Jacobson mentions that voters, although they would have preferred more moderates in office, subsequently voted for candidates with more extreme views who enacted more extreme policies (Jacobson 2011).

Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2011) focus on the effects that Tea Party members of Congress have had on the votes of other members of the Republican Party. They find that members of the House Tea Party Caucus were more likely to take positions and vote farther to

the right of how they would be predicted to vote. An endorsement from Freedom Works did not affect voting behavior. The authors do find that members from districts with a strong Tea Party presence did tend to vote generally with the Republican Party but also broke with the Party on issues particularly important to the Tea Party, such as the expansion of government. The effect of membership in the House Tea Party Caucus was not consistently correlated with particular positions and patterns in voting (Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel 2011).

This research has only started to look at the effects of the Tea Party in Congress. Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2011) seek to identify on which policy issues the Tea Party affiliated members broke with the establishment Republican Party in votes in the House of Representatives. It has been well-documented that Tea Party supporters are generally more conservative than the public (Zernike and Thee-Brenan 2010). It is the potential shift in the moderate Republicans the Tea Party has been able to affect which holds the key to the disproportionately large amount of the agenda they were able to control in Congress in 2011 and 2012. Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2011) have noted that Tea Party members of Congress were not able to affect much change in the positions of other Republican members of Congress but their data only includes votes before the middle of 2011, limiting their sample size.

The previous literature paints a good picture of who the Tea Party supporters are and what their values and motivations may be. Another portion focuses on Tea Party members in Congress. Some research moves in to theories and models behind the outcomes of the 2010 elections. A large part of the outcomes, when looking at the results only in terms of Democratic or Republican victories, or the effect on incumbents, seems to be explained with what happens to incumbent parties when the economy is performing poorly or other theories of "nationalized" elections (Aldrich , Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, and Rohde 2012). Aldrich, Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus,

and Rohde also find that Democratic losses were related to opposition to legislation and the inability to improve economic conditions.

What the research does not address is what was different that led to candidates being successful and then identifying themselves with the Tea Party in Congress. Polling data shows that Tea Party supporters were distinctive from the United States electorate as a whole, but many of these same characteristics overlap with supporters of the Republican Party. This goes a long way to explaining why all of the members of the House Tea Party Caucus, a highly observable measure of Tea Party identity, are Republicans rather than Democrats.

These two factors taken together crowd out the effect of the Tea Party and provide little explanation for why the movement came about at all and why it translated into electoral successes. The constraints suggested by the demographics and the theoretical framework regarding the economy and midterm elections could both easily have been satisfied by electing any other Republican Member of Congress. This provides evidence of the need to isolate the factors that led to districts electing Tea Party Members of Congress as opposed to other Republicans.

The years between the 2008 and 2010 elections saw three events that had major effects on the country (Aldrich, Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, and Rohde 2012 mention similar effects as what is discussed next). The first was political. The election of President Barack Obama was historic not just because it marked the beginning of a new presidential administration but because this marked the election of the first African-American president. This represented incredible historic change and set the tone for the era to be one of "hope" for the country going forward. As much of a positive movement as it was, it also marked a turning away from the Bush presidency. The 2008 election also resulted in major Democratic victories in the United States House of

Representatives and the United States Senate. This gave Democrats a majority in the House and eventually a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate (Cillizza 2009). This political balance had significant policy results, as will be discussed later on.

The second major event was a crisis more than anything else. The months leading up to the 2008 election were particularly damaging for the American economy. The fall of 2008 saw several shocks to the macroeconomy with the failure of big investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. The stock market plummeted and foreclosures and unemployment continued to rise. At the very end of his administration, President Bush and Congress together passed and signed legislation in an attempt to stimulate the economy. Then-senator Obama and Senator McCain sharply turned to focus on their plans for the staggering United States economy.

The third factor was the historic policy achievements of the President and Democrats in Congress between 2009 and 2010. By the time President Obama took office in January of 2009, the economy was far from stabilized. He moved quickly to work with Congress to pass and sign a massive $787 billion stimulus (Fritze 2009). Separate from that was the Troubled Asset Relief Program, popularly called “bank bailouts” (Sullivan and Frank 2010). These measures would only begin to put the economy on the right track, if at all, given how deep and widespread the economic downturn really was and its relationship to the global economy which placed a portion of the solution out of the reach of domestic legislative politics. As the country geared up for the 2010 midterm elections, the economy was on the top of voters’ list of priorities. The dismal economic situation led to a heightened anti-incumbent sentiment in the electorate and low congressional approval ratings.

But the policy which possibly engendered the strongest backlash was the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which the President signed in August of 2010 (Stolberg and Pear 2010). Health care

has been a sensitive issue in American political history, and the Affordable Care Act was particularly ambitious in scope. This was the first time in decades that a President and Congress were able to pass a comprehensive health care reform bill. Previous attempts, such as President Clinton's reform bill in 1993, faced heavy opposition from the insurance and health care industry in general. The anti-health care reform efforts in 1993 were well funded (Clymer, Pear and Toner 1994). The complicated nature of the health care industry makes attempts at reform particularly difficult. Reforms virtually necessitate unusually large pieces of legislation and components which can be difficult to distill into sound bites that would be appropriate for commercials and consumption by the average voter. The result is that health care reform efforts have a tendency to be misunderstood by voters and appear as inefficient overregulation by the government. The failed attempts at health care reform have often been cited as one of the main causes of the heavy Democrat losses in the 1994 midterm election (Berke 1994). Given the history of health care reform in America, it is not surprising that many Tea Party candidates who were ultimately elected into the 2011 freshman class in the House of Representatives focused on opposition to the newly passed and little understood Affordable Care Act, in addition to voters' economic woes.

Many political scientists have cast the 2010 midterm elections as "nationalized" elections, ones in which voters made decisions about whom to vote for based on national conditions. In this light, the midterm results were a reaction to Barack Obama and national conditions (Aldrich , Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, and Rohde 2012). Based on the literature on the few points on which various Tea Party candidates and groups seem to agree, the economy (including government spending) and the Affordable Care Act seemed to be two of the most important factors for mobilization. To the extent that it is the case that the midterm elections

were or were not "nationalized," it is important to look at the national context within which the Tea Party formed, particularly the social and economic changes pre-crisis (2006) up until the 2010 midterms. As research has suggested the economy was among voters' top concerns, economic conditions may have been very important.

American Community Survey data show that between 2006 and 2010, total national population grew 3.3%. Racial composition stayed roughly the same, though the Hispanic portion of the population increased 1.6%. Median age increased by a paltry 0.8%. Despite the down economy, median household income actually increased 3.29%. As might be expected given the hit the housing market took during what was dubbed "The Great Recession," owner-occupied housing units with a mortgage declined 1.7%, and median home value dropped 5.1%.

Table 1

Snapshot Social and Economic Characteristics	2010	% of Population	% Change 2006-2010	2006	% of Population
Total Population	309,349,689		3.30%	299,398,485	
White	229,397,472	74.20%		221,331,507	73.90%
Black	38,874,625	12.60%		37,051,483	12.40%
Hispanic	50,740,089	16.40%		44,252,278	14.80%
Median Age	37.2			36.4	
Median Household Income	50,046		3.29%	48,451	
Owner-occupied housing units with a mortgage	50,339,500		-1.70%	51,234,170	
Median Home Value	197,300		-5.10%	208,000	

Unemployment levels show surprising trends about the demographics this recession most affected. The national unemployment rate increased from 6.4% to 10.8% between 2006 and 2010. The group that saw the highest percentage point increase in unemployment was Hispanics (a 5.4% increase to end at 12.9%). Blacks still had the highest unemployment level by racial breakdown with 17.9%. The unemployment rate for Whites saw the smallest increase of 4.2%, for an overall rate of 9.5%; however, in terms of its initial rate in 2006, unemployment for

Whites increased the most. The unemployment rates by age group show that the largest pure percentage increase was 8%, from 21.7% to 29.7% for those 16-19 years of age. The relative ranking of age groups by highest level of unemployment did not change between 2006 and 2010. Perhaps the most striking change is the unemployment rate by sex. In 2006, unemployment for men and women was at rough parity at 5.5% and 5.9%, respectively. Men, however, saw an almost doubling of their unemployment rate, a 5.3% increase, between 2006 and 2010 as compared with women's 3.4% increase to end in 2010 at 10.8% unemployment for men and 9.3% unemployment for women.

Table 2

Unemployment	**2010**	**% Change 2006-2010**	**2006**
	10.80%	68.8%	6.4%
White	9.50%	79.2%	5.3%
Black	17.90%	42.1%	12.6%
Hispanic	12.90%	72.0%	7.50%
16-19 years	29.7%	36.9%	21.7%
20-24 years	16.9%	50.9%	11.2%
25 to 44 years	10.0%	78.6%	5.6%
45 to 54 years	8.6%	95.5%	4.4%
55 to 64 years	8.1%	113.2%	3.8%
65 to 74 years	7.9%	107.9%	3.8%
75 years and over	6.9%	91.7%	3.6%
Male	10.80%	96.4%	5.5%
Female	9.30%	57.6%	5.9%

The composition of the American economy, in terms of which industries took up the largest shares of individuals employed, changed slightly as well. The industry to employ the largest portion of the population was by far the category of educational services, health care, and social assistance, which accounted for 23.2% of the population in 2010 and 20.8% in 2006. In 2006, the next largest industry was manufacturing, employing 11.6% of the population. In 2010,

the manufacturing industry employed only 10.4% of the population, with retail trade replacing it for the second largest industry by share of the population employed, at 11.7%.

The Tea Party 16: Its Freshman Class and the Districts that Elected Them

When the dust cleared after the 2010 midterms and the new 112th Congress officially took office, the newly formed Tea Party Caucus in the House of Representatives boasted 60 members. As previous literature has suggested and as an even cursory glance of the Tea Party Caucus reveals, many of these members held ideas consistent with the Tea Party before the movement ever really took shape and were far from being new to Congress in the 2010 midterm elections. To really measure the change then and the influence of the Tea Party in electing members to Congress who otherwise might not have been elected, it is critical to focus on the freshman members of the Tea Party Caucus as opposed to all members. These freshman members may be taken as a more accurate picture of the "byproduct" of the popular movement since the incumbent members had some sort of preexisting background and network in politics prior to the movement.

For the purposes of this research, members will only be considered freshman if their first term in Congress came from an electoral victory in 2010. This leaves 16 members of the Tea Party Caucus, collectively from Florida (four members), Illinois (1), Kansas (1), Louisiana (1), Michigan (1), Mississippi (1), Missouri (1), South Carolina (2), Tennessee (2), Texas (1), and West Virginia (1). The geographic distribution of these members is mostly Southern, with 12 members from southern states (Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia and Tennessee). In order to form a better idea of which factors contributed to the success of these candidates in these particular districts, analysis of each district and member in

2010 will be helpful. This may illuminate some trends that were common to the districts that elected candidates in 2010 who joined the Tea Party Caucus in 2011.

Florida 5-Richard Nugent

In 2010, Richard Nugent was elected to represent Florida's fifth congressional district, an area that, according to Barone and McCutcheon's 2012 Almanac of American Politics, has seen fairly quick development, with population growth of 45.4% between 2000 and 2010 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Culturally, the district has a large retiree population. (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Representative Nugent's candidacy in 2010 was somewhat of a surprise. The incumbent Representative Ginny Brown-Waite originally announced that she intended to seek another term in Congress but just after the filing cutoff time for candidates to put their names on the ballot for 2010, she announced that she would not be running and effectively endorsed Nugent instead, then the sheriff of Hernando County. The electoral focus in the district was apparent from the start when Nugent in his comments with Brown-Waite, lauded her efforts on behalf of veterans and seniors (Matthews 2010). Veterans make up 16.3% of the population (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). The district is fairly safely Republican, with John McCain having won in 2008 with 56% of the vote (Cizilla 2010).

Nugent was not originally the Tea Party favorite. Tea Party support mostly went to his primary opponent Jason Sager (Barone and McCutcheon). Nugent's rhetoric during the campaign focused on Sager's Social Security and Medicare plans (Baron and McCutcheon 2011). Nugent also, however, focused heavily on his plans to fix the American economy, including decreasing government spending, cutting taxes. He was quoted as saying, "We need to

stop spending in Washington. You have to take that responsibility" (Show 2010). He defeated Sager in the primary and went on to run against Jim Piccillo in the general election.

Overall, Nugent vastly outraised Piccillo, mounting $518,609 compared to Piccillo's $146,686 (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Nugent's top individual contributors were individuals from The Villages, a large retirement community in the district, followed by employees of the U.S. Army and employees of a construction group. By sector, Ideological and Single Issue groups made up the largest portion of his campaign contributions, totaling $99,574, followed by the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector with $87,695 (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Nugent's rhetoric in the general also focused on spending and the stimulus bill (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). He defeated Piccillo 68% to 33% (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).

Once in Congress, Nugent joined the House Tea Party Caucus and proved himself to be solidly conservative. The National Journal in 2012 ranked him the 107th most conservative member of the House of Representatives (with lower numbers being more conservative). His Composite Conservative score was 76.3 (with higher numbers being more conservative), scoring 71 on economic issues, and 83 on social issues (Morris & Bell 2012). CQ weekly's report on Party Unity, which measures the percentage of times a member voted with his/her party on bills in which the vote breakdown pitted more than 50% of Democrats against more than 50% of Republicans showed that Representative Nugent voted 97% with his party (Ethridge 2012).

Florida 12-Dennis Ross

Florida's 12th District saw rapid population growth (31.7%) between 2000 and 2010 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Just between 2006 and 2010, the population grew 8.4%. This district is more reliant on farming than anywhere else in the state (Barone and McCutcheon

2011) but "proportionately, there are more manufacturing jobs here than almost anywhere else in Florida (though still not very many)" and not enough to make the district more towards manufacturing than agriculture (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). The portion of the district that includes Osceola County brings a demographic of more "younger, bro-business families" (Barone and McCutcheon 2011) though the district overall has a large retirement population.

In 2010, Dennis Ross faced a separate Tea Party candidate in the general election by the name of Randy Wilkinson (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). However, FreedomWorks endorsed Ross rather than Wilkinson (The Washington Post 2011). During the campaign, Ross focused on opposition to the Affordable Care Act and stronger immigration legislation (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Dennis Ross raised $1,174,682 compared to Democrat Lori Edwards' $655,720 and Wilkinson's $45,120 (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Ross' largest individual donor was Publix Super Markets. Like Nugent, The Villages were in Ross' top five individual contributors, pulling in at number four on the list. The industries that contributed the most to his campaign were Leadership PACs, Insurance, Food Processing & Sales, Health Professionals, and Real Estate. The overall sector that contributed most to his campaign was Finance, Insurance & Real Estate (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).

Ross won with 48% of the vote (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Once in Congress, he joined the Tea Party Caucus and was tapped to head the subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and Labor Policy of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (The Washington Post 2011) and was initiated into the National Republican Congressional Committee's "Young Guns" program (Blake 2010). In the National Journal's 2012 ranking of most conservative members of the House of Representatives, Ross landed in a

seven-way tie for the 94th most conservative member (Morris & Bell 2012). He voted with the party 98% of the time on party unity votes (Ethridge 2012).

Florida 22-Allen West

Florida's 22nd district includes Palm Beach, Boca Raton, and Fort Lauderdale. The area has seen a good deal of development (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). The area is historically wealthy but felt the full force of the economic recession. "…Home prices were not expected to fully recover until 2030, according to Moody's Economy.com" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 421).

Allen West ran in 2010 in Florida's 22nd district against Democrat Ron Klein. West's rhetoric during the campaign had blatant racial overtones at times and he has called himself a "right-wing extremist" (The Washington Post 2011). West outraised and outspent his opponent, with $6,542,738 on hand, compared to Klein's $3,776,867. West's top individual contributors were employees of Tbc Corp, Bank of America, Cable Marine Inc., Q-Med Corp., and Rick Case Automotive Group. By industry, West received the most contributions from groups representing the retired population, Republican/Conservative groups, Real Estate, other Finance, and Securities & Investment groups. By sector, individuals employed in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate donated the most to his campaign (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).

West won with 54% of the vote. Once in Congress, West voted with the Republican Party 95% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal ranked him 174 on the Conservative Rankings list, with an overall score of 63.2 (Morris & Bell 2012).

Florida 24-Sandy Adams

Florida's 24th district includes the suburbs of Orlando, Daytona Beach, and New Smyrna Beach. Orlando's strong tourism industry and varied economy have helped it weather the

recession better than some other areas of the state (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). "There are higher than average numbers of homeowners, families with children, working women, and white-collar employees" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 426). The district saw 25% population growth from 2000 to 2010 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Sandy Adams ran in Florida's 24th district in 2010 against Democrat incumbent Suzanne Kosmas (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Kosmas raised and outspent Adams with $2,540,354 compared to Adams' $1,328,778. Adams' largest individual donor was Publix Super Markets. Her top five industries were Leadership PACs, Health Professionals, Retired persons, Lawyers and Law firms, and candidate committees. The Sector that contributed most to Adams' campaign was Ideological and Single-Issue groups, followed by other business groups/interests. Barone and McCutcheon note that this 2010 race was marked by outside spending by the Chamber of Commerce and the Club for Growth. Adams partially campaigned against the ACA (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

In Congress, Adams has voted with Republicans 97% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal gives her a conservative ranking of 31 with an overall score of 86.8 (Morris & Bell 2012).

Illinois 8-Joe Walsh

Illinois' 8th Congressional District includes the area around Chicago and Schaumburg and is home to the head offices of several large businesses including Motorola and Zurich North America insurance. It has been rapidly growing since the 1950s when it was a largely rural area (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Maybe partially because of this, Barone and McCutcheon point to cultural differences between Chicago and the 8th district, pointing out that it is more similar to "the great rural Midwest than…yeasty, lusty Chicago" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 542).

The recession took a huge toll on the area. Schaumburg enacted a property tax when their normal way of raising revenue, the sales tax, no longer provided enough income. Motorola did not weather the recession well, shedding 4,000 jobs globally in 2008. The district voted for Barack Obama in 2008 by a margin of 56% to McCain's 43% (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). The population grew 13% between 2000 and 2010; however, between 2006 and 2010 population actually declined 0.16%.

Joe Walsh's campaign against Democrat incumbent Melissa Bean focused on her support for the Affordable Care Act and the massive spending in the stimulus bill. Walsh promised he would decrease taxes and spending. Although the race was competitive (Walsh won with 49% of the vote to Bean's 48%), the National Republican Congressional Committee never jumped in the race in support of Walsh (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Walsh was heavily outraised and outspent with Bean raising $2,292,879 against Walsh's $624,694. His top contributor was Sage Products. Cancer Treatment Center of America also appeared in his top five individual contributors. He received the most funding from the individuals in the Securities & Investment industry, followed by retirees. By sector, he received the most from individuals in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Obama won this district with 56% of the vote in 2008 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

During his term in the House of Representatives, Walsh voted with Republicans 94% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal ranked him 162 on their conservative scale, with an overall score of 66.5, and being more conservative on social as opposed to economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

Kansas 1-Tim Huelskamp

Kansas' 1st Congressional District is traditionally rural and was mostly prairie in the past. Now, the farming landscape has changed a bit with the presence of "Big meatpacking plants in Dodge City, Garden City and Liberal (the "Golden Triangle of meatpacking")…" which "have attracted large numbers of Hispanic immigrants, mainly living in trailer parks" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 643). Federal farm subsidies are very important to the district as between 1995 and 2009 they were second only to the congressional district accounting for all of North Dakota in the amount of farm subsidies obtained from the U.S. government. The Hispanic population, according to Barone and McCutcheon is becoming more prevalent in the area (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Overall population declined 2.5% between 2000 and 2010 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Tim Huelskamp won the 2010 primary with 35% of the vote after he garnered the endorsements of both the National Rifle Association and former Governor Huckabee of Arkansas, a Fox commentator. In the general, he faced Alan Jilka and won with 74% of the vote to Jilka's 23% (Barone and McCutcheon 2012). Huelskamp raised $1,185,350 to Jilka's $162,130. Huelskamp's largest contributor was Watco Companies, followed by Koch Industries. He received the most group/interest contributions from retirees and had the most support from the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).

During his tenure in the House, he voted with Republicans 96% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal gave him a conservative ranking of 74, with a score of 80.2 overall. The National Journal also ranks him more conservative on social than on economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

Louisiana 3-Jeff Landry

Louisiana's third district has a rich Cajun cultural history, which is well-reflected in Jeff Landry. Oil is an important industry in the district and employed the younger generation in the 1960s and 1970s. In the past few years, the district has been hit by two environmental disasters, the first being Hurricane Katrina and the second the BP oil spill that occurred in 2010. The BP oil spill damaged the district's economy at a time when the U.S. economy had still not made a full recovery. Hurricane Katrina caused significant flooding here. In St. Bernard's parish, the flooding from Katrina wiped out the only hospital, which was not rebuilt until Louisiana's state government granted $76 million to do so in January 2011 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011)

Jeff Landry ran for Congress in 2010 after Democrat Charlie Melancon decided not to run for another term and faced Democrat Ravi Sangisetty in the general. Landry mainly focused on opposing the ACA and reducing the spending in Washington. In addition, Landry mentioned the need to reform Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, programs supported by many Tea Party voters (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Landry raised $1,362,786 to Sangisetty's $828,014. Landry's largest contributor was EP Breaux Electrical. Among his top five individual contributors were several other companies from the oil and gas industry, which was the industry that contributed most to his campaign. Health professionals also made the list of his top five contributing industries. In terms of sectors, Landry received most from general Business groups. He won with 64% of the vote.

Once in Congress, Landry stood with his party on unity votes 96% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal ranked him 36 on their scale of most conservative members in 2011 with an overall score of 85.8, and noted he was more conservative on economic than on social issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

Michigan 7-Tim Walberg

Michigan's 7th Congressional District includes strong historically libertarian viewpoints. The area includes Hillsdale College which accepts no money from the national level. "In 1854, the [Republican] party was founded in the manufacturing and prison town of Jackson as a kind of reformist institution" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 840-841). In the 1930s, the area resisted New Deal programs and interventions and union presence. Socially, however, the district has been more liberal. The economy in the district has struggled with the decrease in the industrial sector, particularly in the automobile sector. (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Tim Walberg ran in the seventh district against incumbent Democrat Mark Schauer. During the campaign Walberg focused on Schauer's support for the massive $787 billion stimulus package. The National Republican Congressional Committee jumped into the race, spending close to $1 million. Walberg also received half a million dollars from American Future Fund (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). In total, Walberg raised $1,678,049 but did not come close to Schauer's $3,255,382. Walberg raised the most money from Ervin Industries. His top five contributors included Leadership PACs, retirees, Republican and Conservative groups, Real Estate, and Manufacturing and Distributing. His top sector for contributions was Ideological/Single-Issue, followed by Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. Walberg won with 50% of the vote (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).

Once in Congress, Walberg voted with the rest of the Republican Party 97% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal gave him a ranking of 40, with an overall score of 85. He was ranked more conservative on social as opposed to economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

Mississippi 4-Steven Palazzo

The 4th Congressional District in Mississippi includes the Gulf Coast and Keesler Air Force Base. Hurricane Katrina took a toll on the area. Part of the money the state received after the storm, the state used to invest in developing Gulfport. The area was hit hard again when BP's oil pump sprung a leak and led to massive amounts of oil which poured into the Gulf area. The district has historically been Republican, at least since the election of President Nixon in 1972 and John McCain won the district with 67% of the vote. Palazzo "…describes his community as characterized by 'God-fearing men and women' who believe in faith and personal responsibility" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 922).

Steven Palazzo is a former Marine and the owner of Palazzo & Co. which focuses preparing tax documents for Americans living overseas. Palazzo ran against Democrat incumbent Gene Taylor in 2010. He accused opponent Taylor of advancing "a 'liberal socialist agenda'" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 922).

Palazzo out-raised Taylor $1,079,453 to $855,983. He received his largest individual contribution from Horne CPA Group. His top five areas from which he drew contributions were Leadership PACs, Retirees, Health professionals, Accountants, and Real Estate. His top sector was Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate. He won with 52% of the vote to Taylor's 47% (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). The National Journal ranked Palazzo 54 on their conservative scale with an overall score of 82.7, noting that he is more conservative on social than on economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

Missouri 4-Vicky Hartzler

Missouri's 4th Congressional District "…includes part of Blue Springs and Oak Grove in Jackson County east of Kansas City, but the overall atmosphere here is rural and small-town"

(Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 942). The area also includes a military flavor from the two bases: Fort Leonard Wood and Whiteman Air Force Base. The district has mixed political heritage, which includes strong anti-slavery and pro-slavery factions. Unlike in the South, these coalitions did not realign their party affiliations. The anti-slavery factions have retained allegiance to the Republican Party while the pro-slavery forces continue to align themselves with the Democrats (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Vicky Hartzler ran against Ike Skelton, a long-serving Democratic representative and chair of the Armed Services Committee who historically enjoyed sweeping victories in the district. Hartzler was a teacher before being elected to the Missouri House of Representatives, from which she ended her political career there after the birth of her daughter. She has opposed gay marriage (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Vicky Hartzler faced Democrat incumbent Ike Skelton. Her campaign rhetoric focused on painting Skelton as connected to liberals in Congress, his support of the emergency stimulus measures and environmental regulations (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). She raised $1,373,530 to Skelton's $2,923,038 but won with 50% of the vote to Skelton's 45%. Her largest contributor was Diamond Pet Foods. Her top five industries were retirees, Leadership PACs, Agricultural Services and Products, Republican and Conservative Groups, and Crop Production and Basic Processing. Her top sector overall was Ideological and Single-Issue groups.

Once in Congress, she voted with the rest of the Republican Party 97% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal gave her a score of 79.3 for a conservative ranking of 85. She was ranked slightly more conservative on social than economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

South Carolina 3-Jeff Duncan

Jeff Duncan represents South Carolina's 3rd Congressional District, an area that historically was comprised of family farms as opposed to large plantations in other areas of the South. The area once included a large plant used for making weapons for national defense, including nuclear materials. This provided many skilled jobs—when the facility shut down, 12,000 people lost their jobs. The area received a large amount of funding from the national government as part of the economic recovery measures. Politically, the district was Democratic in the past but began to support Republicans for culturally conservative reasons during the 1950s, as much of the rest of the South did. John McCain's vote share in 2008 was 64% (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Jeff Duncan played football at Clemson University. He owned his own business, J. Duncan & Associates, which worked in real estate, before he was elected to the state House of Representatives. In that role, he introduced legislation to build a budget for South Carolina which rejected economic stimulus funding (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Jeff Duncan was running against Democrat Jane Dyer in 2010. He outraised and outspent her with $878,903 raised to her $266,698. His largest contributor was from Club for Growth, though he also received large contributions from individual groups in the health care industry. His top five industry contributors were Republican and conservative groups, retirees, Leadership PACs, Health professionals, and Electric Utilities. His largest sector contribution came from Ideological and Single-Issue groups. He beat Dyer 62% to 37% (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). The National Journal gave him a conservative ranking of 113, with an overall score of 75. He is more conservative on social than on economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

South Carolina 5-Mick Mulvaney

South Carolina's 5th Congressional District includes York and Lancaster counties, Sumter (and the Air Force base). Textile production was once a critical part of the district's economy, however, that has since been replaced with more advanced typed of manufacturing (which provide a better standard of living). The district saw a significant spike in unemployment during the recession. The Charlotte area suburbs which spill across the state line include many residents "with no ancestral ties here and with strong conservative views" (Barone and McCutcheon 2012, p. 1458). Historically, the district has been Democratic, but like many other areas of the South, has begun to elect Republicans. John McCain won this district with 53% of the vote in 2008 (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011).

Mick Mulvaney upset the long-serving Democratic chair of the House Budget Committee, John Spratt. Mulvaney previously served as a state representative and state senator where he proved himself to be economically conservative. He joined Governor Sanford in refusing stimulus funding from the national level. "He kept a Gadsden flag—"DON'T TREAD ON ME"—on his Senate desk" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1458). Mulvaney emphasized his opposition to the Affordable Care Act in the 2010 election and garnered support from the Club for Growth and National Republican Congressional Committee (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011).

Mick Mulvaney ran in the fifth district in 2010 against Democrat incumbent John M. Spratt, Jr. Mulvaney was outraised $1,647,870 to $2,035,361. His largest individual contribution came from the Club for Growth. The Freedom Project and Fund for America's Future were also among his top five largest individual contributors. By industry, he received most from retirees, though health professionals and Real Estate were also among his top five. By sector, he received

the most from Ideological/Single-Issue groups. He won election with 55% of the vote to Spratt's 45% (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011). The National Journal ranked him more conservative on social than on economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

Tennessee 6-Diane Black

Tennessee's 6th district includes the central region of the state. It has historically Democratic roots; even electing Al Gore, Jr. as its congressman. Its economic background is mostly agricultural but companies have started to move into the area. The Nissan Altima is manufactured in the district and General Mills is planning to increase development of their manufacturing centers in the area. The district is heavily conservative, voting for John McCain 62% to President Obama's 37% (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011).

Diane Black is originally from Baltimore. She served in the Tennessee House of Representatives starting in 1998 and the state senate in 2004. She proved herself to be conservative both economically and socially. She opposed gay marriage, tax increases, and was tough on illegal immigration. She also introduced legislation that would permit individuals in the state to not participate in the Affordable Care Act requirements (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Diane Black ran against Democrat Brett Carter. She vastly outraised him $2,238,011 to $215,355 and beat him with 67% of the vote (Center for Responsive Politics 2011, Barone and McCutcheon 2011). She received her largest individual contribution from National HealthCare Corp. Several other health-related groups were among her top five individuals contributions. By industry, she received most from health professionals, followed by retirees. The sector from which she drew the most funding was Health. The National Journal put her in a tie for most conservative member of the House with six other members in 2011. She was ranked more conservative on economic than social issues (Morris & Bell 2012).

Tennessee 8-Stephen Lee Fincher

Tennessee's 8th Congressional District has a largely rural portion of the state. It is poorer than the rest of the state. It includes the city of Jackson and the very north part of Memphis. This area has Democratic roots but has become more Republican, with John McCain winning the district 56% to Obama's 43% (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1508).

Stephen Lee Fincher "worked most of his life on the family farm" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1509). He also travels with family members singing gospel. In 2010, he immediately established himself as an excellent fundraiser. Fincher ran against Democrat Roy Herron in 2010. Fincher slightly outraised Herron $2,724,526 to $2,103,121. Fincher's largest individual contributions came from Club for Growth. His top five industries were crop production and basic processing, retirees, Leadership PACs, oil and gas, and Republican and conservative groups. By sector, Fincher received the most from Agribusiness (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011). He won the election with 59% of the vote to Herron's 39% (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011).

Like his freshman Tea Party colleague from Tennessee, Diane Black, the National Journal ranked Fincher one of the seven most conservative members of the House of Representatives (Morris & Bell 2012). He is more conservative on economic than on social issues. Despite this, "he supported the fiscal 2011 budget deal that President Barack Obama struck with GOP leaders in April 2011" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1509).

Texas 27-Blake Farenthold

Texas' 27th district includes a large Hispanic population. The area covers Corpus Christi, down to the Texas-Mexico border. Tourism is a big industry for the district and work on building a wind farm is under way. The area's economy benefited from NAFTA, but some parts of the

district continue to struggle. The district typically votes Democratic, but not overwhelmingly so. Barack Obama's vote share in 2008 in the district was only 53% (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

Farenthold is from Corpus Christi. He graduated from law school but ultimately switched focus and turned to radio broadcasting. Blake Farenthold ran for election against Democrat incumbent Solomon P. Ortiz who outspent him $1,223,982 to $616,618. Farenthold's campaign focused on dismantling the Affordable Care Act. Farenthold narrowly beat Ortiz, winning by only 799 votes. Farenthold's largest individual contribution came from Bay Ltd. He drew considerable support from the oil and gas industry, Leadership PACs, health professionals, contractors, and businesses. By sector, he received the most support from Ideological and Single-Issue groups (Center for Responsive Politics 2011, Barone and McCutcheon 2011).

West Virginia 1-David McKinley

West Virginia's 1st Congressional District includes the North area of the state, close to the Ohio border. It comprises Wheeling, Weirton, Morgantown (home to West Virginia University), and Parkersburg. Economically, it has been heavily reliant on steel and coal production, which have been hit hard in the last couple of decades. The after-effects of a declining national steel and coal industry have not been consistent in the district. In some areas, the new economy has moved has moved in to fill the void with new jobs in services, but others continue to struggle.

The political leanings of the district have, in some respects, mirrored the economic changes. "For most of the 20th century, much of this territory was solidly Democratic. But dissatisfaction with the Clinton-Gore policies on coal mining and the environment helped Republican George W. Bush carry the district twice" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1742).

In 2010, the district elected David McKinley, a small business owner who "…switched parties in 1976 because he said he felt that the Democratic Party did not support limited government" (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1742-1743). McKinley ran in 2010 against Democrat Mike Oliverio. McKinley tied Oliverio to the Democrat Congressional leadership and harmful environmental regulations while emphasizing his own opposition to the Affordable Care Act. He narrowly won, receiving 50.4% of the vote to 49.6% (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1743). McKinley outraised Oliverio $1,783,039 to $1,449,376. McKinley's largest individual contributions came from Mepco LLC. By industry, McKinley received a large amount of support from the mining industry, retirees, Leadership PACs, health professionals and lawyers and law firms. By sector he received the most from Ideological and Single-Issue groups (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).

Table 3

Geography	**Median Age**	**%White**	**Population Growth (2006-2010)**	**%SS**
National	37.2	74.2	3.3	28.4
Florida-5	47.2	87.9	11.1	47.8
Florida-12	38.3	75.4	8.4	34.3
Florida-22	45.6	88.3	1.4%	34.2
Florida-24	39.3	83.1	7.1%	30.8
Illinois-08	36.6	79.3	-0.61%	22
Kansas-01	39.2	90.1	0.66%	32.1
Lousiana-03	35.9	66.4	4.8	30.5
Michigan-07	39.9	89.1%	-1.1%	32.6
Mississippi-04	36.4	72%	5.8%	31
Missouri-04	38.7	92%	3.6%	34.8
South Carolina-03	39.6	76%	4.6%	37
South Carolina-05	38.4	65.7%	8.2%	33.5
Tennessee-06	36	87.9%	8.6%	28.4
Tennessee-08	38.4	74.2%	2.7	33.3
Texas-27	32.1	90.3	4.97%	28.9
West Virginia-01	40.9	95.1	3.6	36

Table 4

Geography	Median HH Income 2010	Median Home Value 2010	Unemployment 2010
National	50,046	197,300	10.8%
Florida-5	42,473	158,300	14.3%
Florida-12	42,150	143,800	13.6
Florida-22	58,319	257,300	10.8
Florida-24	51,960	174,900	10.9
Illinois-08	67,740	237,800	11.8%
Kansas-01	43,367	96,800	5.9%
Lousiana-03	46,048	147,800	10.3%
Michigan-07	46,606	132,500	13.6%
Mississippi-04	40,201	132,200	11.7%
Missouri-04	42,113	128,100	8.3%
South Carolina-03	38,471	130,600	13%
South Carolina-05	38,867	139,600	15.1%
Tennessee-06	43,712	153,200	11.1%
Tennessee-08	37,427	107,800	13%
Texas-27	36,960	111,900	9.7%
West Virginia-01	37,859	110,100	8.5%

Table 5—2012 National Journal Scores and 2011 Voting

Geography	National Journal Score	National Journal Economic Score	National Journal Social Score	Conservative Rank	%Vote with Republicans
National					
Florida-5	75.3	60	86	108	94%
Florida-12	92.5	99	91	15	95%
Florida-22	74.7	51	75	110	93%
Florida-24	79.5	78	86	88	94%
Illinois-08	59.2	68	54	182	88%
Kansas-01	59.8	64	64	180	90%
Lousiana-03	96.2	97	91	4	96%
Michigan-07	85.3	87	85	48	94%
Mississippi-04	86.5	81	80	40	96%
Missouri-04	76.5	75	64	102	97%
South Carolina-03	86.8	87	75	34	97%
South Carolina-05	58.8	64	64	183	95%
Tennessee-06	89.7	87	85	26	98%
Tennessee-08	83.3	70	84	63	97%
Texas-27	79.8	91	70	82	97%
West Virginia-01	54.2	55	49	211	90%

These district profiles and the above summary statistics suggest that the differences between districts electing Tea Party-affiliated members of Congress are fairly idiosyncratic. Some (such as South Carolina's 3rd District) are strongly conservative, but others are much more on the margin. This applies particularly to Joe Walsh's district—the Illinois 8th, which he won with a small margin. These members were not uniformly running in open seats or against incumbents. Some members were up against strong Democratic incumbents with long histories of serving in the House of Representatives. Mick Mulvaney, for example, defeated the chair of the House Budget Committee.

Patterns in demographic make-up of the districts are not consistent. West Virginia's 1st Congressional District has a mostly white population, but Blake Farenthold's district in Texas has a large Hispanic population (though they may have had lower turnout as is common in midterm elections). There is a fairly wide range of unemployment rates and median home values. Just looking at the data, it is difficult to isolate factors that would have been significantly different from what was going on in other districts that might have led to Tea Party success for these freshmen in these districts in particular.

Popular commentary also seems to point to Tea Party members as being more conservative than the average voter, average Member of Congress, or even average Republicans. The National Journal rankings for 2012, however (Table 5), do not show the freshmen members of the Tea Party Caucus to necessarily be more conservative than other Republicans and they have mostly voted with their party. This lack of unifying characteristics suggests it would be useful to look at these members in a more systemic way. For this, a more quantitative analysis is used.

Data and Methods

Data and other research have found Tea Party Members of Congress to be similar to other Republicans and that the 2010 election fits the standard model of midterm election voting when the economy is struggling. The quantitative analysis will focus on isolating factors that may set freshmen members of the Tea Party Caucus apart from all Members of Congress, other freshmen, and other Republicans; as well as what might have set Tea Party Caucus members apart from other Republicans and all Members of Congress. These districts could have elected other freshmen members (if the dissatisfaction was with incumbents, and the sentiment was anti-Washington establishment) or other Republicans (if dissatisfaction was with the incumbent party itself). It is also useful to compare them to all Members of Congress to get a sense of how they are different from the general Congressional body though the effects that result from this are likely to be noisy as it does not control for the Republicans, with whom Tea Party freshmen share many features.

Polls that ask respondents about Tea Party support show that Tea Party supporters are more likely to be older, whiter, wealthier, and more educated than the average voter. The 2010 midterm elections took place in the middle of an economic crisis for the country. Although not necessarily representative of the movement's supporters, rhetoric surrounding the Tea Party at times included anger and resentment. Polling data from Skocpol even suggests some resentment towards the younger generation and more negative views of African-Americans. What the polling data does not tell us is what made districts more likely to elect Tea Party members of the Republican Party instead of other Republican candidates or candidates who had not previously served in Congress.

Tea Party identity will first be defined as freshman members of the Tea Party Caucus in the House of Representatives. Total membership in the Tea Party Caucus is 60 with 16 of those members being freshman representatives. Limiting the analysis to the freshmen members removes the phenomenon that members of Congress had pre-existing ideologies which were already represented in Congress and which preempted the movement, though later analysis will also examine all members of the Tea Party Caucus. Freshmen membership in the Caucus can be seen as a function of two factors: their desire to be recognized as allied with the Tea Party and commitment to their policy objectives, and the extent to which the movement may have made the difference between them winning or losing their election. This isolates the effect of the movement on which candidates were elected.

The link between economic crisis and political extremism is well-documented. There are also some hypotheses surrounding the Tea Party which hint at the social shifts that have taken place in the recent past in American economic and public life. Given the rhetoric that is associated with the Tea Party, the economic conditions at the time, and what previous research shows about the concerns of movement supporters (against the bailouts, healthcare, and big government), it is useful to look at the district demographics (social and economic) that may have led to a district electing a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus.

Data concerning demographic and economic trends comes from the 1 year estimates of the 2010 American Community Survey, which gives an overview of the conditions in each congressional district around the time of the 2010 midterm elections. This is a smaller sample size than the full Census data; however, the Census data is not available broken down by congressional district, which is a significant advantage to using the ACS.

Full campaign funding data for statistical analyses come from the "total receipts" category in Federal Election Commission reports. Some races attracted large amounts of funding which may have been paramount to electoral success. For this reason, these analyses control for level of campaign contributions. They also represent institutional support and implicitly measure support from a variety of interest groups and individuals.

DW scores for members of Congress elected in 2008 (111th Congress) are used as a measure of ideology. Although the DW scores for the members of Congress elected in 2010 are available, they are not used here as the statistical analyses are predicting a relationship about an outcome in 2010. The DW scores for the members of the 112th Congress were measured after they were in fact elected and are based on events that happened after 2010, so would not necessarily be good determinants of the 2010 results. Furthermore, using the DW scores for the 112th Congress would assume that the ideologies of candidates did not change upon entering Congress and that voters would have been aware of a candidate's ideology at the time of election (either via voting record or through some sort of signaling from the candidates themselves). Although it is probably not too problematic to make the assumption that candidates signal their ideologies to voters and that voters are aware of the ideology, it would nevertheless be speculative.

DW scores from the 111th Congress also have an interesting role in the model. Since the ideology is really a measure of the previous representative, this variable measures the reaction of the district to that member's ideology or voting record. Given the anti-incumbent sentiment in 2010, this is a useful relationship to measure. This also looks at the potential strategy involved and compares Tea Party freshmen to the members they were defeating or replacing.

Polling data and previous research provide good starting points as to what are the appropriate determinants of support for freshmen Members of Congress who join the Tea Party Caucus versus incumbent Tea Party members of Congress. The broader context of the economic crisis, the many incumbent members of congress who lost seats in 2010, and the backlash to the economic stimulus and bank bailouts reveal that increased Tea Party support may have been the result of several factors including dissatisfaction with the current political leaders, opposition to the President, the unstable economic environment, and increasing size of government.

The independent variables included in the analysis are DW scores of the previously-elected members of congress, the unemployment rate in the district, percentage of the population that is white, median home value, and percentage of the population that receives Social Security benefits. This last variable may be particularly interesting as it may line up with polling data and the informational interview data from Skocpol about the attitudes towards Social Security benefits. It is also highly correlated with age, which is an important feature of Tea Party supporters. The other factors measure some of the most significant economic changes from the recession and most prominent characteristics of Tea Party supporters. Given the support from higher income brackets, median household income is included in this analysis.

Median home value is an implicit measure of the collapse of the housing market and is also a good measure of wealth, as many Americans hold much of their household wealth in their homes. To look at the effect of the housing crisis itself, the ratio of median home value in 2010 to the value in 2006 is also used, as is the ratio of 2010 to 2006 median household income. Unemployment is often used as a measure of economic health and is included in a significant amount of political rhetoric, implying it is a paramount concern to voters. Unemployment would

also have been one of the ways in which individuals were most acutely and directly affected by the recession.

Many of the economic conditions are correlated with individual characteristics. The first level of analysis is simply the bivariate correlations for each variable with the binary dependent variable of being a Tea Party freshman (equal to 1 if an individual is in that group), compared against the groups: all members of Congress, all freshmen, and all Republicans. This isolates the factors that may have been the most relevant to Tea Party electoral success. Standardized values for these variables are then tested with a logit analysis to measure the effects of each variable on the probability that a district would elect a candidate who would be a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus.

The logit analysis also specifies Tea Party as a binary dependent variable equal to 1 for a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus and 0 otherwise. This creates a very small sample size, which makes the actual effect difficult to estimate but can still specify a more general relationship between conditions in the districts and electing a Tea Party freshman. This analysis is extended to all members of the House Tea Party Caucus, as many other studies have used. This allows for a larger sample size and a systemic treatment of all members to examine if the broader measure of Tea Party identity is significant in a different way. Because of the presence of both social and economic factors and the effect that social factors many times have on economic outcomes, and the overlapping and high correlation between economic factors themselves, lean models are used to test the significance of the factors individually. Combining the models is more difficult as the high degree of collinearity between variables and the small number of Tea party freshmen detracts from the effect.

A third level of analysis focuses on the effect of characteristics of districts on the margin of victory for Tea Party freshmen. This includes interaction terms for the different economic and social variables that were important in the first two analyses. The interaction term allows a test for how those factors and being a Tea Party freshman may have affected the competitiveness of a certain race to see if together those factors are significant.

Results

A bivariate correlation analysis of TP identity (measured as 1 if a representative is a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus and zero otherwise) with respect to all Members of Congress shows that the percentage of the population receiving Social Security benefits is positively correlated with the likelihood that a district will elect a candidate who will join the Tea Party Caucus as a freshman Member of Congress. This is highly correlated with age, but it should be noted that age, on its own, is not significantly correlated with Tea Party identity. The median home value in a district is negatively correlated with TP identity, as is median household income. This is interesting, given the higher average income among Tea Party supporters that polling data indicates.

The unemployment in 2010 in a district was not correlated in any significant way with the likelihood that a representative would be a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus. Ideology of the district does not significantly affect the outcomes, nor does the level of campaign contributions, the median age in a district, unemployment, or the percentage of the population that is white in a district. Some of this runs directly contrary to the polling data, which suggests that Tea Party supporters are more likely to consider themselves to be conservative than the average voter.

When these factors are combined into a logit model (with Tea Party identification specified in the same manner as before), to test the factors that may have led to an increased probability that a district would elect a candidate who would become a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus, some of the effects from the variables change. Each model controls for DW-NOMINATE score, campaign contributions, the population growth between 2006 (before the recession) and 2010, and the percentage of the population that is white in the district. After controlling for these factors, the percentage of a district that receives Social Security benefits is positive and significant in predicting which districts elected freshmen Tea Party members. Unemployment rate in 2010 for a district is also positively correlated and significant. Population growth is also strongly and significantly correlated with electing a Tea Party member.

DW-NOMINATE score is not consistently significant. After controlling for funding and the percentage white in a population, the DW-NOMINATE score becomes significant and negatively correlated with being a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus, but the relationship declines to insignificance when the 2010 unemployment rate is used instead of Social Security beneficiaries or median household income. Funding is not significant in any of the models. The percentage of the population that is white in a district is significant and positive when controlling for unemployment in 2010, median household income, and change in median household income or median home value between 2010 and 2006.

Table 6: TP Freshmen vs. All Members of Congress

All Members of Congress	TP	Dw score	Median HH Income 2010	2010 Median Age	2010 Median Home Value	2010 UE	% w/SS	% White	Funding
TP	1	-.030	-.098*	.086	-.117*	.028	.163**	.091	.043
Dw score	-.030	1	.086	.139**	-.223**	-.255**	.145**	.387**	.019
Median HH Income 2010	-.098*	.086	1	.173**	.667**	-.428**	-.371**	.063	.195**
2010 Median Age	.086	.139**	.173**	1	-.002	-.211**	.700**	.495**	.133**
2010 Median Home Value	-.117*	-.223**	.667**	-.002	1	-.128**	-.388**	-.301**	.064
2010 UE	.028	-.255**	-.428**	-.211**	-.128**	1	.090	-.497**	-.151**
% w/SS	.163**	.145**	-.371**	.700**	-.388**	.090	1	.412**	.010
% White	.091	.387**	.063	.495**	-.301**	-.497**	.412**	1	.140**
Funding	.043	.019	.195**	.133**	.064	-.151**	.010	.140**	1

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Comparing Tea Party freshmen to other freshmen members isolates them from districts who either did not re-elect an incumbent or had open races. This is relevant given the high level of anti-incumbent sentiment in the electorate and the extent to which freshmen face many of the same types of challenges when running either for an open seat or against an incumbent. The bivariate correlations for this group comparison, show that only the percentage of the district's population receiving Social Security benefits have a significant (positive) effect on the likelihood that the district would elect a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus. All of the multivariate logit models again control for DW-NOMINATE scores, campaign contributions, population growth, and the percentage of the district that is white.

Percentage of Social Security beneficiaries in the district is again positively and significantly correlated with electing a freshman Tea Party candidate in the logit model, as is 2010 unemployment rate. Unlike the comparison with all Members of Congress, DW-NOMINATE score, population growth, and the percentage of the population that is white are not significant in any of the models.

Table 7: TP Freshman vs. All Freshmen

Freshman	TP	Dw score	Median HH Income 2010	2010 Median Age	2010 Median Home Value	2010 UE	% w/SS	% White	Funding
TP	1	-.016	-.134	.085	-.182	.113	.208*	.066	.056
Dw score	-.016	1	.026	-.114	-.074	-.054	-.060	-.007	-.171
Median HH Income 2010	-.134	.026	1	.201*	.728**	-.427**	-.382**	.127	.323**
2010 Median Age	.085	-.114	.201*	1	.166	-.143	.681**	.411**	.063
2010 Median Home Value	-.182	-.074	.728**	.166	1	-.228*	-.288**	-.247*	.267**
2010 UE	.113	-.054	-.427**	-.143	-.228*	1	.127	-.438**	-.268**
% w/SS	.208*	-.060	-.382**	.681**	-.288**	.127	1	.233*	-.171
% White	.066	-.007	.127	.411**	-.247*	-.438**	.233*	1	.031
Funding	.056	-.171	.323**	.063	.267**	-.268**	-.171	.031	1

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Comparing Tea Party freshmen against other Republicans, the relationship between Social Security and Tea Party identity hold and is stronger than with the other two groups. Median household income and median home value both display a significant, negative relationship to Tea Party identity. Higher unemployment in districts which elected Republicans increased the likelihood that a member would be in the Tea Party. DW-NOMINATE for the first time consistently exhibits a significant, negative relationship on being in the Tea Party.

In a logit model which controls for DW-NOMINATE, campaign contributions, population growth and percentage of the district that is white, the effect of Social Security

beneficiaries remains and unemployment becomes positively correlated with Tea Party identity. DW-NOMINATE shows a significant, negative relationship in all models.

Table 8: TP Freshmen vs. All Republicans

Republicans	TP	Dw score	% w/SS	% White	2010 UE	2010 Median Age	Funding	2010 Median Home Value	Median HH Income 2010
TP	1	-.283**	.166**	.008	.135*	.069	.042	-.130*	-.149*
Dw score	-.283**	1	-.199**	-.135*	-.006	-.129*	-.090	.149*	.194**
% w/SS	.166**	-.199**	1	.394**	.361**	.701**	-.111	-.328**	-.554**
% White	.008	-.135*	.394**	1	-.188**	.453**	.014	-.285**	-.201**
2010 UE	.135*	-.006	.361**	-.188**	1	.107	-.040	-.060	-.296**
2010 Median Age	.069	-.129*	.701**	.453**	.107	1	-.006	.071	-.004
Funding	.042	-.090	-.111	.014	-.040	-.006	1	.054	.120
2010 Median Home Value	-.130*	.149*	-.328**	-.285**	-.060	.071	.054	1	.803**
Median HH Income 2010	-.149*	.194**	-.554**	-.201**	-.296**	-.004	.120	.803**	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

When broadening the measure of Tea Party candidates to all members of the Tea Party Caucus (which increases the sample size to 60 rather than 16) and comparing them with all members of Congress, a logit analysis, again controlling for DW-NOMINATE in the 111th Congress, percent of the district population that is white, level of campaign contributions, and population growth, DW-NOMINATE score is always positively significant. The percentage of a district receiving Social Security, level of funding, percentage white, and 2010 level of unemployment do not significantly affect the probability that a district will elect a member of the Tea Party Caucus. Median home value is negative and significant. Change in median home value and median household income are not significant. When comparing the Caucus members of other Republicans, none of the variables are significant, though the 2010 median household income is on the border of significance.

Moving into the results for the interaction of these economic and social factors and being a Tea Party freshman on the margin of victory shows that the interaction terms are not significant in any of the models. Being a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus, however, does decrease the margin of victory, but not consistently. When taken in a model with the percentage of the population receiving Social Security, the 2010 level of unemployment, median age, and median home value, the effect of being a Tea Party freshman is not significant. In this model, the DW-NOMINATE score for the previous member of Congress has a positive, significant effect on the margin of victory, though it is a small effect. Median age has a significant, negative effect on margin of victory. The level of unemployment in 2010 has a significant positive effect on margin of victory, though it is a small effect. The level of campaign contributions and percentage of the population receiving Social Security in a district also have small, negative but significant effects on margin of victory.

Discussion

The only factor which shows up across all groups against which freshmen members of the Tea Party Caucus are compared is the percentage of Social Security beneficiaries in a district. This is interesting for a couple of reasons. As measured by a variety of factors, the Tea Party is strongly antigovernment which includes government-funded programs. Skocpol and Williamson note an interesting distinction about which programs this actually applies to. They specifically mention different attitudes towards Social Security, which Tea Partiers are more likely to view as being a return on an investment or system which they paid into over the years (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Social Security beneficiaries are also facing a unique situation. Beneficiaries are older (which is evident from the bivariate correlations) but they also would be more likely to be retired

and facing a fixed income or be in a situation in which their Social Security benefits would be a large portion of their total income. The uncertain economy included high unemployment and a volatile stock market in which some might also have seen high losses in investment portfolios and private retirement accounts. With the high unemployment rate, Social Security recipients would have been facing a dismal job market had they chosen to look for work to supplement their benefits.

With these economic constraints in the background, Congress and the President were negotiating emergency economic policy measures, which led to massive spending and a subsequent conversation on government debt. This was a major concern of the Tea Party (Saad, 2010) at a time when "entitlement spending" (along with tax rates) was the major bone of contention between Congressional Republicans and Democrats. Social Security benefits were typically not among the cuts proposed, but the general situation likely created an environment of uncertainty and protectionism towards the voters' own benefits. In this case, that seems to have translated into an increased probability of electing a Tea Party member, relative to any other group. This may have been both an expression of policy preferences and an attempt to influence policy-making decision in Congress and dissatisfaction with the current economic situation.

The other economic indicators, while not consistent across the groups in terms of the significance of their effects, nevertheless point to some voting based on economic conditions. Taken together, the general effect of the individual variables suggests that a worsening of economic conditions in a district led to increased likelihood of electing a Tea Party freshman. While this is consistent with a theory of negative economic conditions leading to political extremism, it is actually the opposite of what polling data suggests about the overall characteristics of Tea Party supporters. While Tea Party supporters are typically wealthier than

the average voter, median household income decreases the likelihood of electing a Tea Party freshman.

To the extent that Tea Party Members of Congress voted with Republicans and the demographics of the supporters of both the Tea Party and the Republican Party overlap significantly, the results of comparing Tea Party freshman against all Republicans in the House of Representatives becomes particularly interesting. When controlling for a variety of factors, unemployment rate in the 2010 district becomes important, with a higher rate increasing the likelihood of electing a Tea Party member. The effect of income and home value, however, largely goes away.

These results suggest that economic factors did play a role for the freshmen members of the Tea Party Caucus, even among districts that elected Republicans, the non-incumbent party. Median income and home value are highly correlated and the polling data suggests that the supporters of the Tea Party overlap with Republicans in that their median income is higher than average. Polls do not tell us about unemployment. In this case, given the overlap of the other two variables with each other and with Tea Party supporters and all Republicans, unemployment may be a better measure of the difference in the overall economic conditions between Tea Party districts and all Republican districts.

Ideology also becomes significant (with a stronger effect when measured against Republicans as opposed to all Members of Congress). The sign is negative (with ideology being measured on a scale in which larger numbers (positive) are more conservative and lower numbers (negative) are more liberal), so that districts whose representatives were more liberal (compared to other districts represented by a Republican) were more likely to elect a freshman Tea Party member. This may suggest that representatives who had moved to the center (maybe

too far from the median voter in a district) were more vulnerable, easier targets for Tea Party challenges. From the qualitative review of the districts and the 2010 races, it appears not to be a factor of the sweeping 2008 Democratic victories, as some districts replaced Democrat members who had been in office for many years.

Campaign contributions in this model are not significant. The qualitative data again shows that funding varied widely by district. It should be noted that this analysis does not measure funding ratios between candidates. Nor does it include variables such as which groups were important funders such as the Club for Growth or National Republican Congressional Committee. Ideology does not affect the likelihood of electing a Tea Party member when compared to other freshmen. This finding is consistent with other research indicating a strong anti-incumbent sentiment in 2010.

The model with interaction terms shows that the economic and social factors taken together with being a Tea Party freshman did not have any significant effect on margin of victory. Being a Tea Party freshman can decrease the margin of victory. Taken with the effect of the DW-NOMINATE scores of the 111th Congress that appears in the results above suggests that this may be a result of which races the Tea Party members targeted. Some of these districts included incumbent candidates which were weaker than others and would have seen closer races, the effect on campaign contributions supports this. Higher levels of contributions decrease the margin of victory which is likely because funding tends to be higher in more competitive races where it will have a larger effect on the outcome. In this model, the DW-NOMINATE score does have a positive effect on margin of victory, which is the expected ideological relationship. This implies that candidates in districts which had a more conservative member of Congress previously would have a higher margin of victory. This applies for all candidates, not just Tea

Party freshmen. This is consistent with the anti-incumbent sentiment and previous models which suggest the incumbent party does not do well in elections when the economy is poor and the advantage Republicans had in 2010.

The analysis of the whole Tea Party Caucus is consistent with more conservative voters supporting the Tea Party movement. The DW-NOMINATE score is consistently positive here which suggests that districts with more conservative members prior to 2010 and compared to all members of Congress were more likely to elect a candidate who would join the Tea Party Caucus. This implies that these members of the Caucus are more conservative than other members of Congress. This relationship does not hold when comparing the Caucus to other Republicans, suggesting that ideology was not a significant reason why members elected in 2010 joined the Caucus. When comparing the Caucus members to other Republicans, the results suggest that Caucus members were fairly similar to other Republicans. This is consistent with previous research.

Conclusion

The data on the 16 congressional districts which elected freshman members of the House Tea Party Caucus in 2010 do not, on the surface, seem to show certain unifying characteristics among them that distinguish those districts from the economic trends across the country. Using quantitative analysis yields results which point to the significance of the percentage of Social Security recipients in a district and, for Republican Members of Congress, the extent to which representatives were more liberal than other Republicans. This provides support for the theory that worsening economic conditions led to an increase in the success of Tea Party candidates. When extended to all members of the Tea Party Caucus, results are not conclusive as to why

districts elected these candidates as opposed to other Republicans. This analysis includes incumbents and may be affected by the incumbency advantage they would have enjoyed.

This evidence is consistent with the research that suggests poor economic performance leads to political extremism and losses for the incumbent party. The 2010 midterm election cycle was particularly unique in that it came after a major political event in 2008 (the election of the first African-American President and historic policy objectives in the Affordable Care Act and economic stimulus) and a major economic crisis. The midterm elections happened as a variety of forces were coming together which created a perfect storm for a political movement. Without the policy advances, the sweeping Democratic victories in 2008, or the economic crisis, the Tea Party's message may have fallen on deaf ears.

The conditions in 2010 did help Tea Party freshmen candidates, but this can be attributed to their identity as freshmen and Republicans more so than their alliance with the Tea Party. This paper only examines Tea Party freshmen in 2010. Future research should examine the effect of improving economic conditions and how that affected the performance of Tea Party representatives in 2012. It should also expand the definition of "Tea Party" to look at the effects of economic conditions on Tea Party activism, endorsements, and the emergence of a Tea Party candidate in congressional districts.

Tea Party Measured against all Members of Congress

Table 9

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.673	.338	3.950	1	.047	.510
	ZFunding	.273	.202	1.829	1	.176	1.314
	ZRatio106Population	.719	.280	6.569	1	.010	2.052
	ZWhite	.522	.416	1.573	1	.210	1.685
	ZwSS	.874	.270	10.485	1	.001	2.398
	Constant	-3.949	.411	92.354	1	.000	.019

Table 10

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.554	.304	3.310	1	.069	.575
	ZFunding	.180	.179	1.009	1	.315	1.197
	ZRatio106Population	.593	.267	4.951	1	.026	1.810
	ZWhite	1.383	.503	7.565	1	.006	3.988
	Z@2010UE	.742	.340	4.773	1	.029	2.101
	Constant	-3.840	.406	89.625	1	.000	.021

Table 11

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.502	.318	2.481	1	.115	.606
	ZFunding	.289	.186	2.402	1	.121	1.335
	ZRatio106Population	.515	.270	3.646	1	.056	1.674
	ZWhite	.872	.377	5.348	1	.021	2.392
	ZMedianHHIncome2010	-1.049	.467	5.054	1	.025	.350
	Constant	-3.947	.430	84.336	1	.000	.019

Table 12

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.652	.326	4.003	1	.045	.521
	ZFunding	.252	.180	1.943	1	.163	1.286
	ZRatio106Population	.546	.264	4.268	1	.039	1.726
	ZWhite	.690	.386	3.199	1	.074	1.994
	Z@2010MedianHomeValue	-2.087	.864	5.830	1	.016	.124
	Constant	-4.489	.637	49.661	1	.000	.011

Table 13

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.530	.299	3.153	1	.076	.588
	ZFunding	.141	.186	.576	1	.448	1.151
	ZRatio106Population	.574	.285	4.051	1	.044	1.776
	ZWhite	.973	.434	5.033	1	.025	2.646
	ZMedianHHChange	-.174	.284	.378	1	.539	.840
	Constant	-3.670	.365	101.342	1	.000	.025

Table 14

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.520	.299	3.020	1	.082	.594
	ZFunding	.144	.186	.596	1	.440	1.154
	ZRatio106Population	.539	.280	3.697	1	.055	1.714
	ZWhite	.976	.448	4.749	1	.029	2.652
	ZHomeValueChange	-.068	.265	.066	1	.797	.934
	Constant	-3.659	.363	101.454	1	.000	.026

Tea Party Measured against all Freshmen

Table 15

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.107	.422	.065	1	.799	.898
	ZFunding	.367	.338	1.177	1	.278	1.443
	ZRatio106Population	.468	.302	2.397	1	.122	1.596
	ZWhite	.200	.415	.231	1	.631	1.221
	ZwSS	.766	.363	4.452	1	.035	2.152
	Constant	-2.289	.454	25.437	1	.000	.101

Table 16

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.084	.394	.046	1	.830	.919
	ZFunding	.367	.335	1.199	1	.274	1.443
	ZRatio106Population	.464	.265	3.064	1	.080	1.590
	ZWhite	.883	.519	2.891	1	.089	2.417
	Z@2010UE	.887	.423	4.404	1	.036	2.429
	Constant	-2.116	.424	24.969	1	.000	.120

Table 17

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.047	.398	.014	1	.906	.954
	ZFunding	.380	.341	1.244	1	.265	1.463
	ZRatio106Population	.328	.282	1.357	1	.244	1.388
	ZWhite	.417	.412	1.028	1	.311	1.518
	ZMedianHHIncome2010	-.795	.533	2.221	1	.136	.452
	Constant	-2.208	.470	22.055	1	.000	.110

Table 18

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.066	.403	.027	1	.870	.936
	ZFunding	.496	.365	1.841	1	.175	1.642
	ZRatio106Population	.365	.286	1.636	1	.201	1.441
	ZWhite	.265	.421	.398	1	.528	1.304
	Z@2010MedianHomeValue	-2.024	1.057	3.666	1	.056	.132
	Constant	-2.888	.755	14.643	1	.000	.056

Table 19

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.087	.396	.048	1	.827	.917
	ZFunding	.220	.329	.447	1	.504	1.247
	ZRatio106Population	.390	.288	1.833	1	.176	1.477
	ZWhite	.366	.429	.729	1	.393	1.442
	ZMedianHHChange	.132	.375	.125	1	.724	1.142
	Constant	-1.869	.379	24.290	1	.000	.154

Table 20

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-.118	.391	.091	1	.763	.889
	ZFunding	.190	.325	.343	1	.558	1.209
	ZRatio106Population	.386	.279	1.907	1	.167	1.471
	ZWhite	.375	.428	.767	1	.381	1.454
	ZHomeValueChange	-.061	.313	.038	1	.845	.941
	Constant	-1.867	.378	24.332	1	.000	.155

Tea Party Measured against all Republicans

Table 21

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-1.459	.386	14.248	1	.000	.233
	ZFunding	.231	.254	.831	1	.362	1.260
	ZRatio106Population	.562	.314	3.211	1	.073	1.755
	ZWhite	-.525	.568	.855	1	.355	.591
	ZwSS	.860	.314	7.491	1	.006	2.364
	Constant	-2.625	.463	32.131	1	.000	.072

Table 22

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-1.436	.364	15.551	1	.000	.238
	ZFunding	.142	.239	.352	1	.553	1.152
	ZRatio106Population	.385	.305	1.585	1	.208	1.469
	ZWhite	.240	.594	.164	1	.686	1.272
	Z@2010UE	.878	.408	4.640	1	.031	2.406
	Constant	-2.394	.441	29.409	1	.000	.091

Table 23

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-1.288	.369	12.208	1	.000	.276
	ZFunding	.212	.248	.734	1	.392	1.236
	ZRatio106Population	.381	.314	1.470	1	.225	1.464
	ZWhite	-.178	.516	.119	1	.730	.837
	ZMedianHHIncome2010	-.909	.509	3.186	1	.074	.403
	Constant	-2.560	.480	28.391	1	.000	.077

Table 24

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-1.349	.364	13.743	1	.000	.259
	ZFunding	.211	.232	.826	1	.363	1.235
	ZRatio106Population	.383	.310	1.531	1	.216	1.467
	ZWhite	-.275	.522	.277	1	.598	.760
	Z@2010MedianHomeValue	-2.004	1.056	3.603	1	.058	.135
	Constant	-3.220	.751	18.385	1	.000	.040

Table 25

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-1.426	.366	15.221	1	.000	.240
	ZFunding	.085	.256	.112	1	.738	1.089
	ZRatio106Population	.385	.307	1.579	1	.209	1.470
	ZWhite	-.135	.544	.062	1	.804	.874
	ZMedianHHChange	-.041	.277	.022	1	.882	.960
	Constant	-2.264	.403	31.526	1	.000	.104

Table 26

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	-1.440	.366	15.452	1	.000	.237
	ZFunding	.073	.259	.080	1	.777	1.076
	ZRatio106Population	.377	.299	1.594	1	.207	1.458
	ZWhite	-.136	.544	.062	1	.803	.873
	ZHomeValueChange	-.136	.286	.225	1	.635	.873
	Constant	-2.232	.403	30.662	1	.000	.107

Tea Party Caucus Members versus all Members of Congress

Table 27

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	1.003	.186	29.016	1	.000	2.726
	ZFunding	.121	.119	1.033	1	.310	1.129
	ZRatio106Population	.280	.154	3.329	1	.068	1.323
	ZWhite	.166	.241	.475	1	.491	1.181
	ZwSS	.128	.163	.614	1	.433	1.136
	Constant	-2.323	.207	125.896	1	.000	.098

Table 28

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	.986	.184	28.765	1	.000	2.681
	ZFunding	.106	.119	.795	1	.373	1.112
	ZRatio106Population	.258	.152	2.869	1	.090	1.294
	ZWhite	.192	.235	.668	1	.414	1.212
	Z@2010UE	-.133	.190	.488	1	.485	.876
	Constant	-2.327	.208	124.938	1	.000	.098

Table 29

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	1.053	.192	30.102	1	.000	2.867
	ZFunding	.144	.121	1.409	1	.235	1.155
	ZRatio106Population	.242	.151	2.560	1	.110	1.273
	ZWhite	.174	.223	.607	1	.436	1.190
	ZMedianHHIncome2010	-.315	.186	2.882	1	.090	.730
	Constant	-2.341	.208	126.061	1	.000	.096

Table 24

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	1.012	.191	27.962	1	.000	2.751
	ZFunding	.132	.121	1.202	1	.273	1.141
	ZRatio106Population	.212	.151	1.960	1	.162	1.236
	ZWhite	.061	.231	.070	1	.792	1.063
	Z@2010MedianHomeValue	-.600	.274	4.816	1	.028	.549
	Constant	-2.422	.225	116.041	1	.000	.089

Table 25

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	1.008	.186	29.310	1	.000	2.740
	ZFunding	.113	.119	.904	1	.342	1.120
	ZRatio106Population	.222	.163	1.858	1	.173	1.249
	ZWhite	.225	.228	.978	1	.323	1.252
	ZMedianHHChange	.110	.151	.529	1	.467	1.116
	Constant	-2.316	.206	126.593	1	.000	.099

Table 26

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	1.023	.187	29.892	1	.000	2.782
	ZFunding	.128	.120	1.139	1	.286	1.136
	ZRatio106Population	.177	.163	1.176	1	.278	1.193
	ZWhite	.158	.226	.491	1	.483	1.172
	ZHomeValueChange	.298	.165	3.278	1	.070	1.347
	Constant	-2.341	.208	126.447	1	.000	.096

Tea Party Caucus Members versus all Republicans

Table 27

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	.328	.210	2.441	1	.118	1.388
	ZFunding	.109	.119	.838	1	.360	1.115
	ZRatio106Population	.235	.164	2.061	1	.151	1.265
	ZWhite	-.353	.302	1.360	1	.243	.703
	ZwSS	.102	.171	.360	1	.549	1.108
	Constant	-1.293	.263	24.201	1	.000	.275

Table 28

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	.304	.207	2.152	1	.142	1.355
	ZFunding	.094	.117	.647	1	.421	1.099
	ZRatio106Population	.218	.160	1.841	1	.175	1.243
	ZWhite	-.321	.288	1.242	1	.265	.726
	Z@2010UE	-.121	.199	.373	1	.541	.886
	Constant	-1.294	.263	24.132	1	.000	.274

Table 29

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	.390	.214	3.330	1	.068	1.477
	ZFunding	.129	.119	1.187	1	.276	1.138
	ZRatio106Population	.195	.163	1.432	1	.232	1.215
	ZWhite	-.395	.287	1.896	1	.168	.674
	ZMedianHHIncome2010	-.334	.195	2.933	1	.087	.716
	Constant	-1.304	.263	24.499	1	.000	.272

Table 30

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	.376	.212	3.153	1	.076	1.456
	ZFunding	.114	.118	.938	1	.333	1.121
	ZRatio106Population	.163	.163	.999	1	.318	1.177
	ZWhite	-.463	.293	2.488	1	.115	.630
	Z@2010MedianHomeValue	-.552	.290	3.622	1	.057	.576
	Constant	-1.417	.278	25.896	1	.000	.242

Table 31

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	.318	.208	2.341	1	.126	1.375
	ZFunding	.102	.117	.754	1	.385	1.107
	ZRatio106Population	.169	.174	.946	1	.331	1.184
	ZWhite	-.300	.283	1.123	1	.289	.741
	ZMedianHHChange	.128	.156	.672	1	.412	1.137
	Constant	-1.271	.262	23.453	1	.000	.281

Table 32

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	ZDWScore111th	.349	.210	2.766	1	.096	1.417
	ZFunding	.114	.118	.943	1	.332	1.121
	ZRatio106Population	.151	.171	.775	1	.379	1.163
	ZWhite	-.347	.283	1.505	1	.220	.707
	ZHomeValueChange	.281	.166	2.878	1	.090	1.325
	Constant	-1.323	.264	25.190	1	.000	.266

Tea Party Freshmen Margin of Victory

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	55.271	5.650		9.783	.000
	TP	-65.296	35.833	-.548	-1.822	.069
	TPfroshSS	1.645	1.079	.460	1.525	.128
	% w/SS	-.842	.197	-.206	-4.279	.000

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	40.420	1.795		22.516	.000
	TP	-22.601	8.705	-.190	-2.596	.010
	TPfroshFund	5.256E-006	.000	.098	1.319	.188
	Funding	-6.056E-006	.000	-.289	-6.096	.000

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	17.076	4.030		4.238	.000
	TP	12.911	26.477	.108	.488	.626
	TPfroshUE	-2.513	2.277	-.245	-1.104	.270
	2010 UE	1.323	.355	.177	3.723	.000

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	96.130	11.690		8.224	.000
	TP	-109.437	60.508	-.918	-1.809	.071
	TPfroshAge	2.496	1.552	.817	1.608	.109
	2010 Median Age	-1.731	.312	-.262	-5.548	.000

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	28.392	2.122		13.381	.000
	TP	-.577	20.180	-.005	-.029	.977
	TPfroshHomeValue	-9.042E-005	.000	-.117	-.691	.490
	2010 Median Home Value	1.344E-005	.000	.083	1.726	.085

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	30.864	1.075		28.701	.000
	TP	-14.221	5.557	-.119	-2.559	.011
	TPfroshDW111	12.864	14.745	.041	.872	.383
	Dw score	9.185	2.036	.212	4.512	.000

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